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Christmas 1998. Jackson Hole, Wyoming.  A multi-millionaire ex-investment banker sits by the fireplace 
in his ranch, tucked away from the hustle of Washington, D.C. and the misery of the developing world’s 
poor.  He writes on yellow legal pad in an indecipherable longhand about the need for a radical re-
thinking about the processes and contents of international development assistance.  Drafted as a memo to 
the Board of Governors of the World Bank and its management and staff in January 1999, the 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) became an ambitious and elaborate endeavor by World 
Bank President James D. Wolfensohn to “change the way the Bank works”. It had important 
repercussions for the wider development field.   
 
Despite the significance of the CDF, studies of its process and outcomes remain limited to a Bank 
sponsored evaluation (Operations Evaluation Department 2003) or a discussion in an unofficial 
biography of Wolfensohn (Mallaby 2005).  With Wolfensohn’s departure, an assessment of the legacy of 
his CDF by scholars of the World Bank is surely merited.   This paper takes a step in this direction, from 
the perspective of sociological institutionalism, by engaging in an analysis of the CDF initiative within 
two World Bank country offices.  It explores the ways the CDF heightened institutional tensions and 
seeks to understand its consequences for the employee experience of dislocation, for organizational 
politics and power, for the trajectory of the CDF itself and finally, for future prospects of organizational 
reform under Wolfensohn’s successor, Paul Wolfowitz. 
 
In order to do this, the paper is divided into four sections.  Section one presents the theoretical framework 
adopted and methods used in order to engage in a study of dynamics within the Bank.  This proceeds into 
a discussion of the institutional logics of development and a review of the CDF.  Section three then 
investigates the implications of the CDF experiment for intra-organizational politics and external power 
relations by examining the employee experience of institutional tension.   The concluding discussion 
suggests that this examination of the trajectories taken by the CDF can shed light on the sources of 
leverage and limitation in future reforms of the World Bank. 
 
1. Theoretical framework and methods 
 
In order to engage in a finely grained and methodologically robust analysis of dynamics inside the Bank, 
the theoretical perspective of organizational sociology frames this study.  Sociological institutional 
theory directs attention to organizational responses to social norms or institutions governing society 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1987).   Institutions exercise normative, 
coercive and mimetic pressures such that conformity to them endows organizations with legitimacy that 
increases survival prospects, power and resource flows.   Once institutional conformity is achieved 
through processes of institutionalization, the result is enhanced social stability for organizations.   
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In recent years, institutional theory’s focus on the legitimacy and stability acquired through institutional 
adaptation has been criticized for downplaying the tensions and contradictions characteristic of pluralistic 
societies (Clemens and Cook 1999; Friedland and Alford 1991; Seo and Creed 2002; Whittington 1992). 
These theorists point to the multiplicity and conflicting institutional logics that defy assimilation and 
conformance to a singular, homogeneous institution.  Institutional logics are defined as the symbolic 
systems and organizing principles that furnish guidelines for actor behaviors and meanings, supplying 
sense of self and vocabularies of motive (Friedland and Alford 1991: 248).   Logic plurality provides a 
basis for institutional contradiction, conflicts and uneven adaptive trajectories (Sewell 1992: 16-19).  
Political action in these overlapping and fragmented institutional contexts is expected to be oblique and 
subtle, possibly cloaked within acceptable models or deploying familiar models of organization in 
unfamiliar ways (Clemens and Cook 1999: 459).   
 
Two stages characterized the analysis adopted to investigate the institutional logics and trace 
institutionalization processes within the World Bank.  In the first stage, awareness of contradictory 
institutional logics embedded in the CDF emerged inductively after 30 exploratory interviews with 
World Bank bureaucrats in Washington, D.C in November 2002.  A literature review of critical 
development theory further supported the results of this inductive analysis.  In the second stage, the CDF 
process was traced in a comparative post-hoc analysis of the experience in the Bank’s Bolivia and 
Vietnam country offices.  Narrative process analysis is the basis for exploring perceptions and 
consequences of the CDF within the World Bank (Langley 1999; Pentland 1998).   Overall, the goal was 
to become “intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity” so as to write a narrative that 
employees themselves could recognize in focus group discussions after completing fieldwork in each 
office and which could then be iteratively compared against one another (Eisenhardt 1989: 540).  The 
analysis centered on identifying institutional tensions deriving from the CDF experience, as identified by 
country-office Bank employees.  Through a comparative processual narrative analysis, the direction of 
the institutional tension experienced through the CDF is assessed, as well as the consequences for 
organizational power and politics and future possibilities of reform.    
 
In total, 29 interviews (13 in Bolivia, 16 in Vietnam) lasting between 45 minutes to 1½ hours were 
conducted, taped and transcribed.  Interviews were semi-structured and sought to treat three main themes 
but otherwise ceded control of the interview to the interviewee: (1) perceptions of the new “poverty” 
paradigm in the wider development field; (2) the process and consequences of the CDF in the country 
office; (3) and the personal lived experience of the employee within the CDF.    Analysis proceeded by 
thematically coding narrative interview data according to major events or consequences of the CDF 
process using qualitative data software package Atlas.ti.  Each coded text segment was reviewed in an 
iterative manner and instances of “lived institutional tension” within these identified.  These instances of 
“institutional tension” were further reviewed and the generic category refined into two observed trends, a 
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tendency to downplay, excuse or reconcile a self-described tension deriving from the clash between 
institutional logics, or a problematic institutional tension that generated anger, resentment, or questioning 
by informants.  The extracts that capture these two tendencies are italicized in the citations included in 
section four.  Other codes included “power,” and “political” consequences, and these were repeatedly 
examined to narrow them into sub-classifications, identify trends and draft analytical chronologies of the 
CDF process.   
 
Access was negotiated through the CDF Secretariat in Washington, D.C., with country offices in Bolivia 
and Vietnam inviting the researcher for a visit lasting approximately three weeks in each case.  
Organizational embeddedness allowed for ethnographic observations that complemented the formal 
interview process.  The public identification of country offices as “Bolivia” and “Vietnam” was accepted 
in the request for research access that was made.  Interviews with employees were tape-recorded with 
their agreement that they might be quoted in any published results, albeit anonymously.  Preliminary 
interpretations and impressions were presented in focus groups to employees at the end of in-country 
visits and provided an early form of validating findings.  For further validation, a draft copy of this paper 
was circulated to World Bank staff who granted permission for this project.  
 
2. Technocratic and socio-political logics in development: the case of the CDF 
 
In his book The Anti-Politics Machine, James Ferguson classifies literature on the development industry 
into two streams (1994: p.9-11).  In the first, the focus is on managing development to make it more 
effective.   This school is essentially a branch of policy science that sees the development apparatus as a 
tool at the disposal of the planner.  Development is a neutral ‘technical’ instrument that can generate 
desired poverty outcomes if the right combination of goals, processes and conditions are selected.  In the 
second strand of essentially postmodern research, development is a political project of subjugation and 
domination of the Third World.  These two academic approaches to the study of development are 
identified as contradictory and irreconcilable.  This dichotomy is a useful characterization not only of the 
development literature, but also broadly of the institutional logics that govern the practice of 
development.  On the one hand, technocratic logics in the interactive realm privilege professional 
expertise and management, economic science and stability and hierarchical bureaucracies that produce 
measurable results quickly and efficiently.  On the other hand, socio-political logics champion social and 
economic justice for the poor, welcome evolutionary locally embedded participative change and shun 
externally imposed, top-down bureaucratic interventions.   While these logics are antithetical, they are 
also both interdependent and integral to all development engagement. 
 
If legitimacy in the development field currently derives from conforming to both technocratic and socio-
political logics as the history of development, in fact, points to (Amrith 2004; Pieterse 2001; Rist 2002) 
the contradictions and conflicts that can result should become immediately apparent.  To remain open to 
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plurality and accept competing values and evolutionary concepts of change is difficult when planning 
decisions and priorities must be made, often based on scanty and incomplete knowledge.  Although 
technical logics value single-mindedness and rapid, global progress, socio-political logics champion 
debate and slow, embedded change.   While technical logics typically exist as resources of the powerful, 
socio-political ones challenge their rights to this authority.  While technocratic approaches favor 
economic modernization and industrialization, socio-political logics espouse the broader cause of social 
and democratic justice.   Thus, the challenge for development organizations is how to maintain their 
accountabilities and legitimacy in an institutional context where such a duality of social beliefs pervades.   
This challenge can extend to the individual bureaucrat in the World Bank who is obliged to operate 
across the competing norms and identities of an intellectual-activist and specialized professional expert 
(Ascher 1983). 
 
The recent emphasis in the development field on poverty alleviation achieved through partnership and 
participation (Craig and Porter 2003; Maxwell 2003; Stubbs 2003) provides an opportune moment for 
studying these contradictory, if fundamental, institutional logics in the development sector.  This new 
development paradigm appears to be internally torn between technocratic and socio-political logics in 
three over-lapping ways:  
1. uncertainty over the balance between the values and methods of science and the social world;  
2. tensions between professional norms and the desire for empowerment and justice;  
3. conflicts over the balance between complex hierarchical managerial systems and local definitions 
of progress.     
 
In the first dimension, there is concern that the poverty alleviation agenda has adopted a naively 
‘scientific’ and ‘economistic’ approach in analyzing and acting upon local political realities in the 
developing world.   Buzzwords like poverty, participation and ownership are acutely political concepts 
that are de-politicized of their structural political-economy contexts to the detriment of local autonomy 
and democracy but the advantage of state and/or local elite power (Chhotray 2004; Crawford 2003; de 
Herdt and Bastiaensen 2004; Ferguson 1994).    
 
In the second dimension, the new agenda’s emphasis on empowerment and social justice challenges 
professional values that privilege specialized expertise and quick results.   There is a widespread belief 
that professional pragmatism imposes limits on genuine empowerment, if only because it “results in 
complete inertia.”  (de Herdt and Bastiaensen 2004: 877)  Maintaining professional standards of 
‘excellence,’ and preserving monopolies of power may lie in tense relation to demands for local political 
engagement and involvement  (Cooke 2003; Craig and Porter 1997).   
 
Finally, managerial systems associated with new public management orthodoxy abstract from the morass 
of local culture and community, knowledge of which is often uncertain (Craig and Porter 1997: 53-54; 
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Townley 1997).  Strategic performance management systems like results- based management tools and 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms strive to achieve operational results through time-bound, target-
oriented planning frameworks.  These management techniques embrace a  “Christmas tree of aims” 
(Easterly 2002: 25) packaged as “technically necessary actions” and “assembled into compelling 
comprehensive frameworks”  (Porter 1995: 83).   Nonetheless, these managerial systems can be 
impractical and untenable given the nature of local dynamics or they may also control and usurp local 
development goals.   
 
The Comprehensive Development Framework 
The Comprehensive Development Framework arrived in 1999 at the World Bank against the backdrop of 
an emerging normative consensus in development that privileged poverty reduction achieved through 
partnership and participation, the term ‘CDF’ gradually becoming eponymous with this new paradigm.  
As such, the CDF lends itself to an examination through the analytical lenses of the technocratic and 
socio-political logics introduced above.  While the CDF is widely recognized as the philosophical basis 
underpinning the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as well as the brainchild of James 
Wolfensohn, its role as an impetus for internal organizational change for mid-level staff inside the Bank 
is less widely known.   
 
In the wake of this new moniker, a new department—the CDF Secretariat—was created with the support 
of many bilateral agencies and presidential sponsorship.  The Secretariat was expected to monitor ten 
countries (and Bank country offices) that volunteered to “pilot” the new framework, including Bolivia, 
Cote d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Jordan, Kyrygz Republic, Morocco, 
Romania, Uganda and Vietnam.  Piloting the CDF inside Bank country offices was supposed to display 
the “willingness of key development agencies…to change their culture and practice” (Wolfensohn 2000: 
3).   The CDF involved the creation of a “management matrix” that would visually set out “who was 
doing or planning what” in order to create “real chances of achieving longer term targets in a more 
effective and accountable manner.”  (Wolfensohn 1999: 27)  The need for comparative monitoring and 
evaluation of these pilots marked the codification of the CDF into four “measurable” principles. These 
were: equal treatment between social and “structural” concerns and macroeconomic and financial issues, 
country ownership of the policy agenda, partnership with all stakeholders, and a long-term holistic vision 
of development built through national consultations and focused on results (CDF Secretariat 1999).   
 
While the CDF has already been criticized for believing that “largely intangible benefits can be 
programmed, produced, and measured much like any other project output” (Pincus, 2002: 78), it makes 
sense to examine the micro-consequences within the CDF pilot offices to assess this claim.  The rest of 
this chapter explores the institutional contradictions arising from these antithetical logics as experienced 
by World Bank staff situated within CDF pilot country offices.   
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3. Experiencing the CDF inside the World Bank 
 
The CDF may have been a set of four lofty principles but what did it actually entail in local offices? 
What were its achievements?  What, if any, obstacles did it encounter, and what can this tell us about the 
way organizational reform happens inside the World Bank?  This section begins to address some of these 
questions based on an understanding of the CDF process inside two World Bank offices—Bolivia and 
Vietnam—that agreed to pilot the framework.   
 
In a relatively propitious political context, Country Directors of World Bank offices in Bolivia and 
Vietnam capitalized on the plurality and ambiguity embedded within the CDF to engage in experiments 
of organization.  
And then when the CDF came, it was a great.  [It] provides a sort of institutional backing 
in which you can do anything. […] The people working in Bolivia said,  “Great, the CDF 
provides the institutional cover to do things in the name of CDF things that you wanted to 
do in the Bolivian pilot which you wouldn't have had the cover to do. […] This is a 
wagon to hitch to.”  (WBB P1: 0277-0232)1 
 
Notably, the CDF was largely perceived to have had a far smoother and more successful trajectory in 
Vietnam than in Bolivia.  The following section argues that this derived from the CDF’s apparent 
incompatibility with the Bank’s existing technocratic practices and norms in Bolivia.  The ambitiousness 
of the Bolivian pilot to challenge internal disbursement pressures and centralized lines of accountability, 
that is, to actively pursue some of the norms and practices of the socio-political logic, generated 
problematic, intense and explicit institutional tensions for employees.  In contrast, in Vietnam 
institutional tensions were downplayed, subtler and less vivid.   The following section presents these 
findings by referring to employee narratives to explore, in the first instance, the intra-organizational 
political consequences of the CDF and secondly, the power implications for Bank-government relations.   
The discussion between the political and power repercussions for the Bank arising from the CDF is 
separated for the sake of clarity rather than from a rejection of a reciprocal relationship between the 
Bank’s internal political relations and its external power resources. 
 
De-centralization and the CDF: the politics of partnerships and pillars 
In Bolivia, the World Bank office piloted the CDF by organizing itself into a “pillar structure” mirroring 
the Government’s 1997 Plan General de Desarrollo Economico y Social to demonstrate their support for 
Bolivia’s national development strategy. Three expatriates were decentralized to the local office to staff 
units that had become known as the Institutionality, Equality and Opportunity pillars.  These pillars 
crosscut traditional operational sectoral divisions at the Bank—Environmentally and Socially Sustainable 
Development, Human Development, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM), Private 
Sector Development and Infrastructure, Financial Sector—leading to confusion over accountabilities.  
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Meanwhile, decentralizing power to local offices entitled country staff to draft contracts and appoint 
consultants without headquarters’ approval.   Procurement reform also launched as part of the CDF 
challenged centralized and universal procurement practices.  The Bolivia office recruited a financial 
manager and procurement specialist to facilitate the work of de-centralized pillar leaders, while a national 
professional filled the position of “Civil Society Coordinator.”  Equality among pillar leaders was 
accepted and each rotated as the Bank’s Resident Representative, with this Representative accountable to 
the Country Director in Washington, D.C.  The Country Director for Bolivia decentralized to La Paz 
during the summer of 1999 as part of the CDF pilot.      
 
This de-centralized pillar structure proved problematic for the Bank’s bureaucracy because it interfered 
with its traditional centralized and hierarchical structures.   In the Bank’s matrix management structure, 
sector staff are directly accountable to their Sector Coordinators (traditionally located at headquarters), 
although they are also seen to have responsibilities towards the geographic units in which they are 
located.  The pillar structure challenged this accountability relation as the Bolivian office used the CDF 
to publicly throw its weight behind a short-lived domestic government strategy.  National professional 
staff within the Bank sensed that de-centralization was still resisted in Washington, although they too 
shared skepticism of the appropriateness of modeling their internal organization on the Government’s 
pillar strategy.    
In Bolivia there was, an experiment was also made with decentralizing the Bank's 
decision-making process. Which ended up being kind of a sham. […] [I]t never really 
worked because in reality the process really wasn't decentralized. Ultimate decision-
making was in Washington, not only at the Board but also with Washington mangers.  
And also, the way it was internally organized here was incoherent in managerial terms.  
Three pillars and they were all equal and nobody came with a final decisions.  Nobody 
was in charge of saying 'the buck stops here.'  […] 
[T]he most stupid decision was made that the Bank's processes would not only be 
decentralized in Bolivia, be concentrated is the right word actually, but that the office 
itself would model, would model itself in terms of the Government's plan.  And that was 
like.  Ridiculous!  I mean, how can you do such stupidity! (laughter)  I mean the 
Government itself is not organizing itself according to its own plan how can the Bank 
organize itself according to the Government's plan!  And that stupidity became evident 
when the plan was revised and the Government destroyed its own pillars! And the Bank 
was like, “Now what do we do with our pillars?” I mean that was something.  I mean that 
was really stupid.  (WBB P9: 0313-0358) 
 
The pillar structure pushed the norms of localism forward by challenging sectors on the need for top-
down bureaucracy with neatly defined lines of accountability and responsibility.  While the CDF justified 
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this desire for increased autonomy from centralized managers and the greater importance attached to the 
“local” collective interest, it also resulted in “managerial incoherence” that generated an explicit and 
intense experience of institutional tension for staff. 
 
Vietnam represents an entirely different scenario. Prior to the launch of the CDF, the Vietnam office had 
exercised decentralization opportunities first offered through the 1997 Strategic Compact that aimed to 
improve the Bank’s business activities with a one-time injection of US$250 million.  With the arrival of 
the CDF, decentralization accelerated as six Sector Coordinators moved from Washington, D.C. to the 
local office and national professional staff numbers dramatically increased.  Demand for “greater 
partnership” by the Vietnamese Prime Minister resulted in the Bank actively championing “Partnership 
Groups” across all sectors of donor activity.  These groups met regularly and sought to improve 
information sharing and coordination (World Bank 2000).  The 26 Partnership Groups set great 
importance on who chaired and coordinated donor activities.  While the donor agencies chairing these 
groups varied by sector, the Bank assumed leadership in areas dealing with economic and financial 
policy as well as the highest profile group of all, the Poverty Working Group.  The stated aim of all 
groups was to eventually yield the position of chair to government, a powerful symbol of enhanced 
“country ownership.”  The Bank also hired a “Partnership Specialist” who, among other responsibilities, 
oversaw the production of Partnership Reports.   These reports eventually became a biannual monitoring 
tool of the Partnership Groups.   
 
Unlike in Bolivia, in Vietnam the CDF pilot did not antagonize central managers in Washington as it 
respected the Bank’s operational sector divisions.  This being said, the CDF did generate conflicts as 
operational sector staff were now expected to engage in “innovative” activities (e.g. community 
development projects, participatory forums, etc.) that placed high demands on their time with little 
measurable benefit for either speed or quality of project implementation.  Nonetheless, senior 
management and economists in the PREM sector continued to push these new poverty alleviation 
activities.    
Q. You talked about the sectoral partnership groups.  What was that and were you 
involved? 
Again it is a very good idea.  I mean you have, in this country, hundreds, literally 
hundreds and hundreds of different people participating in development, external 
agencies participating in development.  All going in various directions and often 
contradicting each other in policy advice, the requirements they impose on government.  
Obviously it makes sense to try to bring people together.  […] But it takes a lot of time.  
But we do have a partnership in [my] sector and it is fairly effective.  But again, I can't 
spend much time on it.  It is not as perfect as it could be.  There are various competing…   
I see my number one priority is to ensure that all the projects that I am responsible for are 
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prepared on time and are implemented properly.  And anything else for me is less 
important.  Now, as we said right at the beginning, I am not sure that Senior Management 
would have seen it that way.  They probably wouldn't have disagreed but certainly during 
[the last Director’s] time that would have been seen as a sore point.  It would have been 
more important to go to the Partnership Meeting than to supervise the project.  (WBV 
P10: 0370-0392)  
 
Political tensions between operational sectors and PREM arose from the way the CDF challenged the 
meaning of professionalism itself.  What did respect for professional norms entail—project management 
or ‘partnerships’ and policy dialogue?  Who was a professional poverty alleviator—sector managers or 
PREM policy analysts?   In Vietnam, narratives by operational staff identified such tensions but 
underlined their commitment to handling both “project and partnership.”   Nonetheless, they often 
mentioned ‘lack of time’ as an important obstacle to reconciling both logics, and thus generally were able 
to justify their continued allegiance to traditional technocratic practices.   Unlike in Bolivia however, the 
underlying rationality of the socio-political logic embedded in the CDF was never doubted, mainly 
because the CDF did not pose an imminent threat to existing configurations of professional autonomy 
and authority.   The CDF conformed to existing norms of professionalism within the Bank, which can 
explain why there was less resistance to its institutionalization than in Bolivia where the location and 
definition of professionalism was explicitly challenged. 
 
Focusing on development results: the fight for power 
In Bolivia, the CDF provided a rationale for initiating a costly offensive against corrosive governmental 
corruption that threatened the managerial integrity of Bank projects.  This intrusion into domestic matters 
was resisted not only by the Bolivian government, but also by senior Bank management fearful of the 
implications of this political action on their portfolio.  Portfolio success in a country office is an 
important internal proxy for the Bank’s performance, acting as a strong symbol of its technocratic 
competence.   Four factors measure overall portfolio success: (i) size and value of loans; (ii) rates of fund 
disbursement or disbursement ratios (iii) quality of lending in terms of development results; (iv) project 
supervision costs.    Many studies of the Bank have suggested it possesses an over-riding concern with 
quick disbursement that has resulted in poorly implemented projects that fail to meet development 
objectives (Miller-Adams 1999; Payer 1982).   Ironically, in such situations portfolio performance will 
appear to be better.  While there are additional indicators of project quality within the Bank that seek to 
measure poverty impact and ‘results,’ the difficulty of tracing causality has translated into portfolio 
success remaining an important internal proxy of Bank effectiveness. 
 
Frustration with government corruption in Bolivia resulted in the Bank using the pretext of the CDF to 
suspend disbursements across all projects in fiscal year 2000.   This spurred a conflict between the 
Bolivian Bank office and the government over the limits and possibilities of the socio- political logic 
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represented by the CDF, for which the local office received little support or sympathy from Bank 
management at headquarters who feared short-run negative portfolio consequences.  The government 
defended itself against the Bank’s attack on corruption by drafting an alternative version of the CDF, the 
Nuevo Marco de Relacioniamento, which underlined the importance of respecting “local” ownership 
norms.  For its part, the local office countered this argument by underlining the importance of preserving 
the integrity of management practices, including auditing and disbursement regulations, despite the 
impulse of localism.  They also justified their political intrusion into the arena of corruption in the short-
run as a means of securing long-run improvements in disbursement ratios and project effectiveness.    
  
We had here a very difficult project [that] was suspended for almost two years because 
we found corruption in the implementing agency.  […]  For instance in that case, the 
Bank had some requirements.  And the Bank said okay, we cannot go ahead with 
disbursement if the audit is not ready.  An acceptable audit saying that at least the funds 
that were not involved in those corrupted processes were used for intended purposes.  
And we were two people from the Bank in a meeting with twenty people from the 
government. […]  Telling them these are the rules, we need this, this and this because of 
this.  And suddenly a government official stood up and said, “I don't care. We as a 
government have the right to decide because the CDF gives us the right to decide.  And 
the CDF says, ‘You have to be flexible with the government because of this and this and 
this.’”  And he simply said, “I am going to talk to the Country Director.” […]  
That speech was made many times by different project officials, “No, the CDF says 
this.”  So that was difficult to use because I couldn't go to the disbursement [unit] and 
say, “You know the Government says they are not going to do this because the CDF 
gives them the right to do it.”  So that was when disbursement at some point said, “I 
don't understand that CDF.  But the Bank rule says this.  And this is the rule that governs 
my work. And I am going to require this.” (WBB P7:0659-0693)   
 
The CDF became a media through which the contestation of power between the Bank and the 
Government occurred over the relative importance of measuring short-run Bank performance through 
disbursement proxies and the socio-political reality that disbursement pressures against a backdrop of 
corruption impinged on aid effectiveness.  But without higher-level management support for such an 
offensive, the local office quickly lost both internal and external credibility as a ‘partner’ of government.   
This resulted in accounts of dislocations and tension for staff disappointed that the CDF could not 
generate internal consensus and courage to champion socio-political logics.  The Bolivian office rapidly 
recovered their previous disbursement ratios, accelerated in part due to the emergence of a financial crisis 
in 2003 that legitimated pumping in greater aid resources to avert economic collapse.   
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In direct contrast to the Bank’s experience with the CDF in Bolivia, in Vietnam the office successfully 
obtained consensus with government on the relative balance to be maintained between technocratic and 
socio-political logics.  Here, it is important to recognize that the relation of power between the Bank and 
the Vietnamese government favors the latter to the extent that Vietnam is a reluctant and slow Bank 
borrower. This is despite being assessed as having an extremely high capacity to absorb development 
funds (approximately US$ 800 million annually in concessional loans) and remains the Bank’s second 
largest concessional borrower in the world with its cumulative portfolio valued at over US$ 2 billion 
(World Bank 2002).  The need to convince a potentially huge client of the merits of greater and faster 
borrowing for development requires donors to tread softly and subtly (Eyben 2003: 9).   
 
Thus, the Bank was left to tactfully persuade the Vietnamese government of the merits of their financing.  
This was achieved by emphasizing that Vietnam’s expected growth rates would soon make it ineligible 
for concessional Bank financing.  “In other words, if they don't lift their game over there in Government 
and if we don't lift our game in portfolio issues, the country loses anywhere between three to four billion 
concessional money that at some stage has to be borrowed from the financial markets at much higher 
rates.” (WBVP12: 0375-0379)  Given this reversal of traditional donor-recipient power relations, the 
Bank cautiously addressed the controversial issue of corruption in an opaque Communist state for fear of 
jeopardizing an under-performing portfolio.  Instead, the Bank sought to foster the government’s trust 
through the CDF and informally lobby for faster project implementation.   
 
The Bank’s measured lobbying of government did not generate sought-after improvements in the 
portfolio, however.   Portfolio performance stagnated as basic bureaucratic inefficiencies to disbursal 
within the Vietnamese government lay outside the negotiated consensus over the socio-political  
parameters of the CDF.  Nonetheless, through CDF-inspired displays of confidence and good faith (e.g. 
partnership groups, consultations with other stakeholders, etc), the Bank acquired credibility in relation to 
the wider development community and government.   The CDF also enhanced the office’s internal profile 
within the Bank, with Wolfensohn visiting in 2000 and staff receiving a Presidential Award for 
Excellence for their involvement with the CDF.   These added internal legitimacy benefits may offer one 
explanation as to why the Vietnam office could deflect organizational pressures over its poorly 
performing portfolio for as long as it did (in sharp contrast to the Bolivian case), and why the CDF 
continued two years past the official end of the pilot phase in 2000.   
 [The Country Director] was spending all his time on this partnership stuff and people 
were saying, “Our portfolio is going down the spout.”  Which it was, true to say, because 
he was spending all his time on donor relations and relations with government and being 
on TV, and all the rest of it.  But people recognize that it has raised our profile 
enormously and on the whole went along with it.  Vietnam has been the biggest feather 
in [Senior Management’s] cap because of everything on the CDF, and piloting 
everything.  Because Wolfensohn came here and absolutely loved it, and still talks about 
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it three years later.  And because of everything else we do.  That more than compensates 
for the difficulties in the lending program. And, because other countries also have 
difficulties.  We are not a worse case scenario by any means. (WBV P1 0747-0754, 
0838-0854) 
 
Nevertheless, the arrival of a new Country Director to Vietnam in December 2002 did seem to be 
directing attention towards the more conventional managerial concerns of project implementation and 
disbursement indicators.  Operational staff in particular welcomed this shift in priorities away from 
partnerships and dialogue.  In this new era, they described the previous Country Director as a visionary 
leader who had failed to achieve an appropriate balance between “portfolio” and “partnership”—the 
countervailing practices of the technocratic and socio-political logics of development.   
 
4. Implications of CDF trajectories for Bank reform 
 
The legacy of the CDF is certainly a mixed one.  While Wolfensohn successfully generated field-wide 
support for his framework and bequeathed it a lasting legacy in the PRSP, his ability to translate its 
socio-political norms into concrete and lasting organizational practices within Bank offices proved more 
challenging.  In the Bolivia office, strained relationships with government and headquarters resulted in a 
re-centralization of sector staff, the elimination of pillar groupings and the CDF’s termination in 
September 2000 at the official end of the 18-month pilot stage.  Meanwhile, “partnership practices” and 
de-centralization continued for at least an additional two years in Vietnam, even if disbursement ratios 
continued to stagnate.  Understanding this divergence in the ways the CDF unfolded inside the Bank can 
shed important light on the possibilities and limitations of future reform efforts. 
 
It would seem there remains great difficulty challenging entrenched technocratic norms and practices of 
development inside the World Bank.   While technocratic logics have been institutionalized in the 
development field since the post-war era and continue to be a characteristic feature of all bureaucracies, 
the strength of socio-political logics have ebbed and flowed in the history of development (Amrith 2004; 
Pieterse 2001).  Practices that enact socio-political logics are typically framed as political resistance and 
social movements (Escobar 1995a; Escobar 1995b; Ferguson 1994) that do not square easily with the 
existence of large bureaucracies like the Bank.  The CDF experience points to the fact that the Bank is 
still confronted with the dilemma of enacting socio-political logics through the application of 
technocratic practices (Cooke 2003; Crawford 2003).  It must face the difficult question of how to 
bureaucratically organize for the championship of socio-political norms associated with practices of 
empowerment, social justice and cultural embeddedness.  Platitudes like partnership largely remained de-
coupled from core project work in Vietnam, while more radical efforts in Bolivia seem to generate 
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considerable resistance from higher levels of Bank management.  These tensions and conflicts ultimately 
result from the antithetical nature of the constitutive institutional logics of development. 
 
Secondly, the difficulty in challenging the entrenched technocratic logic of development to advance the 
socio-political logic points to their intrinsic interdependence in the practice of development.  It is this 
fundamental interdependence that must be acknowledged, and then exploited, if the Bank is truly 
committed to the advancement of the socio-political logic.  One way this can occur is if organizational 
reform processes inside the Bank at least give the appearance of conforming to the scientific, professional 
and managerial norms of development.   In our account, the Bolivian pilot experienced far greater 
difficulty institutionalizing the CDF because it overtly challenged technocratic practices like centralized 
accountability structures and disbursement indicators.   In contrast, in Vietnam the CDF did not threaten 
the integrity of sectoral activities and interests directly, nor did it antagonize government over political 
reform or brandish the Bank’s powers of coercion.    As might be expected, this subtler and more tactful 
approach in Vietnam provided a stronger platform of legitimacy that, in turn, could be used to deflect 
internal disbursement pressures and justify de-centralization beyond the CDF pilot phase.   
 
The technocratic veneer of the CDF camouflaged an inherently political project of organizational reform 
that could challenge key ingredients of the Bank’s organizational culture—including the principles of a 
centralized bureaucracy where pre-occupations with disbursement reigned supreme.   This finding 
supports those who suggest development organizations do strategically resort to technocratic languages 
and practices in order to launch challenges against them (Arce and Long 2000: 40).   While more 
empirical and ethnographic attention within the Bank would be needed to determine whether Bank staff 
routinely exploit technocratic practices to camouflage engagement and advancement of socio-political 
goals, this essay marks an early attempt to highlight that room for maneuver does remain within the Bank 
(see also Bebbington et al. 2004).  It gives reason for some optimism about the prospects of 
institutionalizing socio-political logics at the World Bank, even under James Wolfensohn’s controversial 
successor, Paul Wolfowitz.  In fact, this paper highlights that widespread preoccupation with the 
appointment process of Bank Presidents may be misplaced as it ignores the significant ways Bank 
bureaucrats can and do manipulate executive directives. 
 
In addition to conforming with technocratic logics, reform within the Bank will proceed with greater ease 
if it can secure legitimacy from external sources.  For example, organizational tolerance of portfolio 
deterioration during the CDF pilot in Vietnam can also be explained by compensatory enhancements to 
the office’s bargaining position and reputation with the external development community.  This points to 
the fact that within the Bank, legitimacy may be an alternative standard of excellence to “development 
results” and ‘disbursement ratios.”    In contrast, in Bolivia where the CDF nakedly challenged 
technocratic practices both within and outside the Bank, limited external legitimacy could not 
compensate for lack of internal legitimacy, with the result that even the slightest transgression of 
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technocratic practices was met with hostility.  These divergent trajectories of the CDF may explain why 
in Vietnam, the experience of institutional tension was of lower magnitude and intensity than in Bolivia, 
with employee narratives taking plains to downplay the severity of institutional conflicts.    
  
Finally, the type of institutional dislocation experienced in the CDF process may be an important 
indicator of possibilities for future reform.  This finding supports theoretical claims that unsettling, 
emergent contexts heighten self-consciousness and improve future possibilities for acts of agency 
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 1006-1007).   In Bolivia, the legacy of problematic institutional 
contradiction and the emergence of a growing and seemingly acute political crisis at the time of 
fieldwork in September 2003 combined to expand capacities for imaginative and/or deliberative 
responses to this uncertain context.  This instability prompted a distinct imperative to disburse funds to 
provide the Bolivian government with the liquidity to prevent political and financial collapse.  
Nonetheless, the CDF had generated knowledge of opportunities for maneuver by the Bolivian office that 
could be brought to bear even in the present moment of crisis.   
Before we were working for CDF, in the name of the CDF.  Now I don't think it has any 
power.  Now the new name of the game is harmonization.  Now, before everybody was 
scrambling internally, institutionally to show progress on the CDF.  Now they don't give 
a damn.  Now they want to show progress on harmonization.  Or doing the same sort of 
thing they were trying to do under CDF but now calling it harmonization instead of CDF.  
Now we are cooking something to bring out champions of harmonization.  Saying it is 
okay to do this.  It is okay to do this alignment.  […] Now the buzzword is 
harmonization.  The task is to say, “Well, if this works, I'll use it.” 
Q. So the CDF isn't over?  
It is a change of names, emphasis and actors.  That's all. (WBB P1: 0501-0514) 
 
Narrative accounts of problematic institutional tension in Bolivia also demonstrate the excitement of 
unfolding possibilities for agency, largely missing in accounts from Vietnam (with the possible exception 
of those working in the PREM sector who stood the most to gain from the CDF).   Meanwhile, a 
relatively unproblematic experience of institutionalization in Vietnam generated less need for considering 
alternatives to the CDF that had served the office reasonably well, with the result that ideas for future 




This chapter has highlighted the ways the CDF, both conceptually and practically, suffered from 
contradictions deriving from a fundamental conundrum arising from multiple and conflicting institutional 
logics operating in the field of development.  Traditionally governed by technocratic logics that have 
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privileged professional expertise and management skills, economic knowledge and apolitical and 
hierarchical bureaucratic interventions, development organizations realize that institutional legitimacy 
also requires adaptation to a logic demanding greater social justice for the poor and embedded change 
processes driven by local participation and devolved control of the development apparatus.  This 
institutional contradiction is highly apparent in country offices where employees are located on the 
threshold of clashing logics, as in the case of Bank country offices trying to institutionalize the new 
poverty agenda by experimenting with the CDF.     
 
The divergent trajectories of the CDF experiment derived in no small part from the ways the CDF was 
exploited to alter the balance between technocratic and socio-political logics within the specific intra-
organizational and national contexts of each office.   In Bolivia, the CDF was more visibly antagonistic 
to traditional constituencies as it explicitly sought to challenge entrenched technocratic practices to 
advance reform; hence the greater intensity and prevalence of problematic institutional contradiction.   In 
contrast, the less ambitious political project in Vietnam framed itself as conforming to the Bank’s 
technocratic norms and practices, which may explain why employees could and did reconcile 
institutional tensions in their accounts of the CDF.  As the office gained legitimacy and power through 
the CDF, even underperformance of the traditional standard of technocratic excellence—the portfolio—
could be tolerated.  These divergent processes and experiences of institutional tension provide some 
tentative indication of the direction that future reforms within each office might take.    
 
In his critique of the CDF, Devesh Kapur writes that it  “paper[ed] over the inevitable conflicts between 
competing objectives by a mindless win-win argot that substitutes saccharine for substance and avoids 
the reality of trade-offs.”  (Kapur 2002: 74)  Although the CDF proposal was certainly an ambitious 
project of organizational reform that did present itself as a way to reconcile conflicts between 
technocratic and socio-political logics, this paper should also demonstrate that its institutionalization was 
always going to a fine balancing act between the institutional logics embedded in the new poverty 
alleviation paradigm.  By paying lip service to the “reality of trade-offs,” the CDF permitted strategic 
actors to challenge entrenched bureaucratic interests and practices and discover the relative costs and 
benefits of tradeoffs themselves as they pushed the boundaries of acceptable organizational reform.  
While the CDF failed to transform technocracy in any sustainable or systematic way, that a strategic 
challenge could, and indeed was, temporarily mounted against technocracy in both offices bodes well for 





1 The codes included after quotations refer to the country office (WBV for the Bank’s Vietnam office and 
WBB for the Bolivian office), the primary document (a coded reference to the informant in question), 
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